Joining nuclear club will be a test of trust Paul Kelly The Australian

Howard's energy ambitions may conflict with Bush's bid to curb proliferation, writes Editor-at-large Paul Kelly
July 19, 2006
JOHN Howard's aim to join the uranium enrichment game faces a serious foreign policy challenge: how to avoid conflict with the Bush administration, which is determined to restrict nations from entering into enrichment and reprocessing.
This new energy and anti-proliferation policy lies at the heart of George W. Bush's second term. Bush is promoting what his officials call "a nuclear renaissance" with three aims: to promote energy security, curb greenhouse gas emissions and limit nuclear weapons proliferation. These policies are emerging as a defining aspect of Bush's presidency. They were given further expression this week before the St Petersburg G8 meeting when Bush and Russia's Vladimir Putin reached a historic new agreement to work together "to allow all nations to enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy without pursuing uranium enrichment and fuel cycle technologies".
Bush and Putin made a joint appeal to "other nations to join us" in this global project. It follows Bush's earlier historic deal with India on civil nuclear co-operation that is also designed to bring India closer to the non-proliferation mainstream.
In an interview with The Australian, Howard said that Bush's nuclear policy was a factor in his decision to establish an inquiry into Australia's role in the nuclear fuel cycle. Howard agreed that any Australian decision will have important consequences in the emerging global debate.
Bush's policy comes under the title of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, announced in February 2006. It is a truly radical initiative. Its vision is that nuclear fuel supplier nations (America, Russia, Britain, France, China and Japan) would undertake to provide "user nations" with reactors and nuclear fuel on a "cradle-to-grave" basis with provision for spent fuel takeback. This is best understood as a global bargain to guarantee a reliable nuclear fuel supply to nations in exchange for their agreement not to enter into enrichment and reprocessing.
GNEP's significance was outlined to the House of Representatives Committee on Industry and Resources on June 1 in a submission by the head of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, John Carlson, who said: "GNEP would benefit non-proliferation objectives by limiting the spread of enrichment and reprocessing, that is, the technologies essential to producing fissile material for nuclear weapons."
Asked directly last month in Washington what would be the Bush administration's attitude towards an Australian decision to become an enrichment nation, a senior US official replied: "I am not able to say."
This non-answer is not just because the question is hypothetical. It is because any Australian decision creates a conflict for the US between its global nuclear strategy and its alliance obligations. If GNEP has any meaning, it is that an Australian enrichment decision would be seen as a bad precedent, yet this conclusion would be offset by trust in Australia as a reliable ally and responsible player in the nuclear fuel cycle.
During Howard's US visit last month he was briefed on GNEP by Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman. Interviewed 12 days ago, Howard said while his US meetings were not the "catalyst" for his inquiry they were "part of the process". Howard agreed the US wanted to identify and limit nations that enriched uranium in order to create a global bargain to contain proliferation.
During the interview, Howard made clear his personal preference. "It does seem odd that you wouldn't enrich uranium, doesn't it?" he said of Australia. "One of the great historical anomalies of the Australian economy which most Australians could never understand is that we had the best wool in the world and we sent it overseas to be processed and we bought it back at a much higher price. That always struck people as rather odd. Now there are a lot of reasons why it happened. But I would be keen to avoid that occurring."
Asked about GNEP, Howard said: "I'm not suspicious of it. But I'm keen to keep an eye on it and keen to ensure it doesn't damage Australia's position. And part of the process was that I felt we need to be better informed about all of this.
"I think it (GNEP) further focuses our attention, concentrates our mind. If we were to decide in the not too distant future that it would be a good idea to process uranium or to keep open that possibility, that would obviously have relevance to GNEP. The fact this is being developed is a reason why we should look more closely at whether we should process uranium.
"We are probably the largest single holder of uranium reserves in the world, we have the largest uranium mine, so we are going to have a strong view and I think the Americans will understand that. I got the impression that GNEP is still embryonic and precisely because it is embryonic, it would be a very good idea for Australia to have a view from the beginning so we can influence it. One of the advantages of making noises about this, about our position and possible plans, is that of itself it alerts the Americans and others to our position."
For Howard, it is inconceivable that the US would not endorse any Australia enrichment decision. "I think any American administration would accept it," he said. "Certainly, the present one would accept it. I can't imagine a future administration would have a different view. We would be seen as a totally reliable and trustworthy country."
Howard would want to tie any Australian decision into the US global strategy. The issues are vast. At stake for Australia is whether we develop the nuclear technology to become a player in the fuel cycle and, also, obtain more leverage over the non-proliferation regime. On Monday, Howard revealed his conviction that Australia has a "massive opportunity" to boost its share of the global energy trade.
It is now beyond question that nuclear power around the globe is undergoing a major resurgence. The issue for Australia, however, remains theoretical until a commercial operator comes forward prepared to invest in enrichment, and that may need a US partner.